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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - HABITUAL CRIMINAL - RIGHT OF
ACCUSED TO COUNSEL UNDER FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Petitioner, a middle-aged Negro of little education, was indicted for
housebreaking and larceny. At the trial, two months after indictment,
petitioner, intending to plead guilty, appeared without counsel. When
his case was called for trial, he was advised by the court that he
would be tried as an habitual criminal because of three alleged prior
offenses.' Conviction as an habitual criminal carries a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment, with no possibility of parole.2 Peti-
tioner's prompt request for a continuance in order to obtain counsel
on the habitual criminal accusation was denied, and the case im-
mediately proceeded to trial. The jury, after hearing evidence, ac-
cepted petitioner's guilty plea to the housebreaking and larceny
charge. Evidence was then introduced as to his prior convictions,3 and
the jury found him guilty of the habitual criminal charge. After serv-
ing his sentence on the housebreaking and larceny charge, petitioner
sought his release through habeas corpus proceedings 4 in the Ten-
nessee courts on the ground that the habitual criminal sentence was
invalid because he had been denied counsel. His efforts in the state
courts were unsuccessful and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.5
Held, reversed. Petitioner is being held under an invalid sentence,
as he was denied right to counsel guaranteed by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chandler v. Fretag, 75 Sup. Ct. 1
(1954).
At common law an accused had no right to the assistance of counsel
-even retained counsel. Originally in England a prisoner was not
permitted to be heard by counsel upon a plea of not guilty when
charged with treason or a felony.6 This rule was not relaxed for trea-
1. At the time of petitioner's conviction, the Tennessee Habitual Criminal
Act permitted an oral accusation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11863.5 (Williams Supp.
1952). It was subsequently amended so as to require inclusion of the accusa-
tion in the indictment on the substantive offense. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 11863.5
(1950).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11863.2 (Williams Supp. 1952).
3. The court seems to assume that proof of prior convictions was introduced,
although there was a dispute as to this. There was also a dispute as to
whether petitioner pleaded guilty to the habitual criminal charge.
4. Under Tennessee law, a defendant sentenced on both a felony charge
and an habitual criminal accusation must serve his term on the felony charge
before he can attack the validity of his habitual criminal sentence in habeas
corpus proceedings. State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore, 182 Tenn. 94, 184 S.W.2d
366 (1945).
5. Chandler v. Warden Fretag, 347 U.S. 933 (1954).
6. 1 CmriY, CmrIMNAL LAW 406 (5th Am. ed. 1847).
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son until 1695,7 and continued in full force until 1836 for felonies.8
Constitutional provisions (state and federal) in this country were
designed to abrogate this common-law rule, which denied one accused
of a felony the right to be represented by counsel. 9 Thus it is gen-
erally provided that an accused in any criminal case has a right to be
heard by himself or by counsel.' 0 These provisions have been in-
t4erpreted to include the right to assistance of counsel though the ac-
cused is without the necessary means to employ and compensate an
attorney," and though the accused did not request assistance of
counsel in his defense.12 However, the exercise of this right may be
regulated by reasonable rules and regulations.'3 It is the usual prac-
tise, and frequently a statutory duty, to inform the accused of this
right at or prior to arraignment. 14 Some courts have recognized this
duty only when the accused is charged with a capital offense,1 5 and
others have interpreted their constitutions and statutes as imposing
no duty at all on the trial judge to inform accused of his right to be
represented by counsel.'
6
4..7. 7 WILL. 3, c. 3, § 1 (1695).
8. 6 & 7 WILL. 4, c. 114, §§ 1 & 2 (1836).
'9. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942).
.10. See BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL n~r AMERICAN COURTS 80-84 (1955)
(differences in wording among the constitutional provisions are without
significance).
. 11. FED. R. CRmI. P. 44; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); State ex
rel. White v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d 129 (1941); see People
v. Rose, 42 Cal. App. 540, 183 Pac. 874, 879 (1919); State ex rel. Irvine v. Dis-
trict Court, 125 Mont. 398, 239 P.2d 272, 280-81 (1951); People v. Shapiro, 188
Misc. 363, 67 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1947). Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 44, effective in the federal courts since March 21, 1946,
providing "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at
every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed without counsel
or is able to obtain counsel," has settled the question of right to counsel in
federal courts. It seems that this was a mere codification of what had al-
ready been established by the federal decisions. See Spevak v. United States,
158 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 821 (1947). Many states
provide by statute for the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.
BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 10 at 84-87.
12. FED. R. CmvI. P. 44; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Wilcoxon v.
Aldredge, 192 Ga. 634, 15 S.E.2d 873 (1941); Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308
Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 537 (1948); Ex parte Cook, 84 Okla. Cr. 404, 183 P.2d
595 (1947); see Bradley v. State, 227 Ind. 131, 84 N.E.2d 580, 581-82 (1919).
13. United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 268 Fed. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1916);
City of Seattle v. Erickson, 55 Wash. 675, 104 Pac. 1128, 25 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1027
(1909).
14. See, e.g., FED. R. CRmvI. P. 44; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
Brandt v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 601, 178 P.2d 224 (1947); People ex rel. Har-
rison v. Wilson, 176 Misc. 1042, 29 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see Terri-
tory v. Hargrave, 1 Ariz. 95, 25 Pac. 475 (1873); People v. Miller, 137
Cal. 642, 70 Pac. 735, 737 (1902); State v. McDonnell, 165 Minn. 423, 206 N.W.
952, 953 (1926); State v. Cowan, 25 Wash.2d 341, 170 P.2d 653, 655 (1946);
Note, 3 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1949).
15. People v. Bute, 396 Ill. 588, 72 N.E.2d 813 (1947); Commonwealth ex Tel.
Withers v. Ashe, 350 Pa. 493, 39 A.2d 610 (1944); Note, 3 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1949).
16. Weatherford v. State, 76 Fla. 219, 79 So. 680 (1918); Gatlin v. State,
17 Ga. App. 406, 87 S.E. 151 (1915); see Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250
46 S.E.2d 406 (1948) (Virginia has no constitutional provision with regard
to counsel for accused in criminal cases).
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Overshadowing the constitution and statutes of each state, with
regard to the right to counsel, is the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.17 By a-series of id6-
cisions beginning in 1932 with Powell v. Alabama,18 the United ;States
Supreme Court has defined the right to counsel which the due process
clause guarantees to persons accused of criminal offenses in state court
proceedings. There can be no doubt that an accused, in capital cases;-is
entitled to hired counsel, and to a reasonable opportunity to -empl6y
and consult with him.19 Likewise, in capital cases, where the a-
cused is unable to employ counsel of his own, he has an unqualified
right to court-appointed counsel,20 and this right is not Satisfied-by
an assignment at such time and under such circumstances as to, pre-
clude the giving of effective aid in preparation and trial of the case.4
That in non-capital cases there is no express formula for determining
the requisite of procedural due process was clearly indicated in Betts
v. Brady.22 The trial must be "fair,"23 but fairness may be satisfied in
some cases when the accused is not represented by counsel.2 4 Cer-
tainly, an accused is entitled to hired counsel in non-capital cases, and
to a reasonable time to prepare his case.25 However, where the ac-
cused is indigent and unable to employ his own counsel, the right
is not unqualified as in capital cases.2 6 The court determines from the
17. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
19. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
20. Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271
(1945); see Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948). However, .the
right may be waived and if it is, the fact that there was no counsel to defend1
accused is not a deprivation of due process. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S: 1 73
(1946).
21. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.P.V444
(1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); cf. House v. Mayo,. -24:t.S.
42 (1945); see White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945); Glasser f..:Vnited
States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
22. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
23. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Gibbs v. Burke, 337-.U.S. 773
(1949). "Fairness" is tested by an "appraisal of the totality of the. facts
in a given situation." Betts v. Brady, supra, at 462-63.
24. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S.
145 (1947). "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction . . . of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of far-
ness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result,:in
a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the
Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense,
or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who.
is not represented by counsel." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
25. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); Accord, Avery v. Alabama, 308, U.S.
444 (1940); see White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945); Palko v. Connectiut,
302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 .(1932)-.
26. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). A minority of the members bf the
Court disagree. They take the position that the Fourteenth Amendment, in-
corporated all the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights (including .the
Sixth Amendment), thus making them applicable to the states; and therefore,
a state court cannot dispense with counsel for an accused in any fel6ny
case unless the accused refuses counsel with an understanding of-his rights.
See Bute v. Illinois, 333 'U.S. 640, 677-79 (1948) (dissenting opinion);-Betts
v. Brady, supra at 474-77 (dissenting opinion).
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facts of each particular case whether the defendant has been deprived
of procedural due process.27 Where the gravity of the crime and
other factors-such as age, education, intelligence and courtroom
experience of the defendant,28 the conduct of the court or the prose-
cuting officials, 29 and the complicated nature of the offense charged
and the defense thereto30 -render proceedings without counsel so
likely to result in injustice to the accused as to make them fundament-
ally-unfair, the accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel whether
he requests it or not,31 and whether or not he pleads guilty.32
In a situation where due process otherwise requires that the de-
fendant have the assistance of counsel, it is doubtless true that this
right may be waived by the defendant, providing his waiver is made
with full understanding of his right.33 The state need not force counsel
on an unwilling defendant.
There can be no doubt that an accused would be entitled to a con-
tinuance, in order to obtain counsel and prepare his defense, if the
state should spring upon him, at the trial, a new offense not charged in
the indictment.3 It is equally clear that when an accused is given
ample pre-trial notice of an offense, with opportunity to engage
counsel and prepare a defense, he is not entitled to a continuance
in order to obtain counsel.m The instant case falls between these two
extremes. Here, when confronted with the habitual criminal accusa-
tion, petitioner immediately requested a continuance in order to ob-
tain counsel. 6 Though the Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act3 7 does
not create a separate offense, but only increases a defendant's punish-
ment on being convicted of his fourth felony,38 the hearing and trial
27. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
28. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672 (1948).
29. See Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736 (1948); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
30. See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
31. See Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335
U.S. 437 (1948); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
32. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437 (1948) Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471 (1945) (defendant pleaded guilty after request for court-appointed
counsel refused).
33. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); see Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335
U.S. 437, 441 (1948); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788-89 (1945).
34. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941). In this case, the Court speaks
of notice of the real nature of the charge as being "the first and most uni-
versally recognized requirement of due process." 312 U.S. at 334.
35. Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 821 (1947).
36. The Tennessee Attorney General in the instant case contended that
accused had no constitutional right to counsel, relying on Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942). However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that Betts v. Brady refered only to court-appointed counsel, whereas ac-
cused wanted a continuance in order to obtain his own counsel.
37..TENN. CODE Supp. §§ 11863.1-11863.7 (1950).
38. State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore, 182 Tenn. 94, 184 S.W.2d 366 (1945);
cf. Tipton v. State, 160 Tenn. 664, 28 S.W.2d 635 (1930).
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on the felony charge and on the habitual criminal charge are es-
sentially independent of each other,39 though conducted in a single
proceeding.40 The trial court and the Tennessee Supreme Court
reasoned that the accused, having had two months between indict-
ment and trial to acquire counsel, waived his right by not acquiring
counsel within this period. They further reasoned that waiver by the
accused of his right to counsel for the housebreaking and larceny
charge also constituted waiver for the habitual criminal charge, since
the act does not create a separate offense, but simply increases punish-
ment on being convicted of a fourth felony. The United States
Supreme Court, while recognizing that the statute does not create a
separate offense, held that, in reality, the habitual criminal charge
and the felony charge were independent of each other, and that the
accused must be given ample time after accusation as an habitual
criminal to procure counsel. It seems clear that fundamental justice
requires the result reached by this decision.
DIVORCE-ALIMONY DECREE TERMINATING UPON
REMARRIAGE OF WIFE-EFFECT OF ANNULMENT
OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
A separation agreement incorporated in a divorce decree required
the husband to pay alimony during the wife's life "unless and until
she shall remarry." The wife remarried but thereafter obtained an
annulment. In an action to enforce the original alimony decree, the
trial court accepted the wife's contention that the husband's alimony
obligation was revived by the annulment of the remarriage. The
judgment for the wife was reversed by the intermediate appellate
court and the wife appealed. Held, affirmed. The divorced wife's cere-
monial marriage to a second husband was a remarriage even though
grounds for annulment existed and, in view of a statute under which
the second husband may be required to support the wife after the
annulment, the first husband's duty to support was not renewed by the
annulment of second marriage. Gaines v. Jacobsen, 124 N.E.2d 290
(N.Y. 1954).
The duty imposed by law upon the husband to support his wife' is
39. See McCummings v. State, 175 Tenn. 309, 311, 134 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1939);
cf. Tipton v. State, 160 Tenn. 664, 28 S.W.2d 635 (1930).
40. Compare, e.g., the West Virginia procedure which provides for a
separate hearing on the habitual criminal issue. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6130,
6131, 6260 (1949). See Graham v. State of West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
For a collection of cases interpreting habitual criminal statutes, see Notes,
116 A.L.R. 209 (1938); 82 A.L.R. 345 (1933)e 58 A.L.R. 20 (1929).
1. See Bostick v. State, 1 Ala. App. 255, 55 So. 260, 262 (1911); State v.
Loyacano, 135 La. 945, 66 So. 307 (1914).
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the basis for the alimony awarded in divorce proceedings. Annulments,
on the other hand, were conceived at common law as relating back to
the ceremony and invalidating the marriage ab initio.2 Thus when a
marriage is annulled there remains no duty of support upon which to
predicate alimony.3 In the leading New York case of Sleicher v.
Sleicher,4 involving facts substantially similar to those of the instant
case, the court, adopting the "relation back" fiction, had held that the
first husband's alimony obligation was revived by the annulment of the
wife's remarriage inasmuch as the annulment was a determination that
no remarriage had occurred. 5
Implicit in and underlying the Sleicher case was the inescapable
corollary of the "relation back" reasoning-that the second husband
could not be required to support the wife of the annulled marriage.
The instant case was projected against a background different from
that of Sleicher in one material respect-the courts had received statu-
tory authorization to award support payments in annulment proceed-
ings notwithstanding the logical difficulties presented by the time-
honored "relation back" doctrine.6 Thus with the underlying reason
for the Sleicher result abrogated by statute the court in the instant
case had to determine whether the "relation back" theory would never-
theless require the first husband to bear the burden of support by
virtue of the fact that there had been no "remarriage" within the mean-
ing of the original divorce decree. Recalling that it had been recognized
in Sleicher that the "doctrine of relation [back] is a fiction of law
adopted ... solely for the purpose of justice,"7 and that this doctrine
is not without limits prescribed by policy and reason,8 the court in the
2. Withers v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 91 Cal. App. 735, 267
Pac. 547 (1928) (after annulment of second marriage, status of parties was
such that they could no longer be divorced, thus court no longer had power
to enforce alimony under previous divorce of parties); Cohen v. Kahn, 177
Misc. 18, 28 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (after annulment, since the marriage
was destroyed, wife could sue husband in tort for fraud connected with
marriage).
3. Aldridge v. Aldridge, 116 Miss. 385, 77 So. 150 (1918). See also Therry v.
Therry, 117 Fla. 453, 1.58 So. 120 (1934); Monteleone v. O'Hanlon, 159 La. 796,
106 So. 308 (1925); Kellogg v. Kellogg, 122 Misc. 734, 203 N.Y. Supp. 757 (Sup.
Ct. 1924); Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S.E. 736 (1890). Contra,
Strode v. Strode, 66 Ky. 227 (3 Bush 1867).
4. 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929).
5. But cf. Lehmann v. Lehmann, 225 Ill. App. 513 (1922).
6. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1140-a: "When an action is brought to annul a
marriage or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may give such
direction for support of the wife by the husband as justice requires." This
statute, important in New York State where the annulment proceeding is
widely used due to the fact that adultery is the only ground for divorce,
recognizes the interest of the state in providing for persons unable to support
themselves, and enables the court to consider the good faith of the wife in
contracting the marriage, although the statute is not limited to instances in
which the wife is the innocent party. See 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 610 (1941). See
Johnson v. Johnson, 295 N.Y. 477, 68 N.E.2d 499, 500 (1946).
7. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501, 502 (1929).
8. Instant Case at 293.
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instant case refused to fictionalize and held that the wife's second
marriage, though subsequently invalidated by annulment, was never-
theless a "remarfiage within the meaning of the separation agree-
ment incorporated into the divorce decree."
The position of the court regarding the efficacy of the annulled
marriage to terminate the first husband's liability for support is not
surprising in view of the trend of cases in New York and other juris-
dictions, recognizing the rights of a wife who in good faith enters a
void or voidable marriage. The courts of this country have modified
the harsh-law rule that no rights as a wife could be acquired by a void
marriage, and have effected the distribution of property upon the dis-
solution of void and voidable marriages by various theories,9 such as,
quasi-contractual obligation,10 quasi partnership, 1 and grounds of
equity and justice.' 2 Moreover, annulled marriages have been given
sufficient validity to provide valid consideration for a gift,13 make a
remarriage bigamous, 14 and, by statute, legitimize any children born
of the union1
5
This trend of relaxation from the common-law rule has caused
several states in addition to New York to provide by statute for ali-
mony in cases of void marriages. 16
The words "unless and until she shall remarry" in the separation
agreement caused some concern to the court. The dissenting judge felt
the words contemplated a valid marriage. This problem of whether the
words refer only to the ceremony of marriage or to the status or re-
lationship created thereby has previously confronted the courts.17
Those interpreting the words as referring to the ceremony reason:
First, no one would contend that the separation agreement should be
9. But cf. DeFrance v. Johnson, 26 Fed. 891 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886).
10. Ah Leong v. Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1928).
11. But cf. Schmitt v. Schneider, 109 Ga. 628, 35 S.E. 145 (1900).
12. Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127 (1898); Chrismond v. Chris-
mond, 52 So.2d 624 (Miss. App. 1951); Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96
Pac. 1079 (1908).
13. American Surety Co. of New York v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783
(1929) (innocent party to a voidable marriage allowed to retain what had
been conveyed). But cf. Rubin v. Joseph, 215 App. Div. 91, 213 N.Y. Supp. 460
(2d Dep't 1926) (different result reached where party at fault was the
recipient).
14. Accord: Jordan v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., 136 Mo. App. 192,
116 S.W. 432 (1909); McCullen v. McCullen, 162 App. Div. 599, 147 N.Y. Supp.
1069 (1st Dep't 1914). Contra: Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).
15. E.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 1135; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Cum. Supp.
1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8453 (Williams 1934).
16. See Stapleberg v. Stapleberg, 77 Conn. 31, 58 Ati. 233 (1904); Daniels
v. Morris, 54 Iowa 369, 6 N.W. 532 (1880); Strode v. Strode, 66 Ky. 227 (3 Bush
1867) (divorce for bigamy); Bickford v. Bickford, 74 N.H. 448, 69 Ati. 579
(1908); Lea v. Lea, 104 N.C. 603, 10 S.E. 488 (1889) (pendente lite); Vanvalley
v. Vanvalley, 19 Ohio St. 588 (1869).
17. Compare Lehmann v. Lehmann, 225 Ill. App. 513 (1922) with dissent of
Hamiter, J., in Keeney v. Keeney, 211 La. 585, 30 So.2d 549 (1947).
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revived if the marriage ended in death or divorce18 and likewise it
should not be revived in case of an annulment. Second, to hold that
the divorced husband's obligation to pay alimony is terminated only by
a subsequent valid marriage by the divorced wife would render the
divorced husband always subject to a decree reviving his obligation
to pay, even though he may have remarried and assumed other obliga-
tions.19 There is no statute of limitations protecting the divorced hus-
band in this type of situation.
The court stresses in the instant case that the "purpose of justice"
dictates that the discharge effected by the second marriage be perma-
nent and that the wife should not be given the opportunity to choose
between the first and second husbands for the most profitable source of
support.
DIVORCE-STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF DOMICILIARY
JURISDICTION-CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATION OF
POWER OF TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE
Petitioner, after six weeks continuous presence in the Virgin Islands,
sought a divorce there. The applicable statute' provided that in a
divorce proceeding if a plaintiff has been within the jurisdiction for
six weeks prior to filing his complaint and the defendant has been
personally served or (as was the case here) enters a general appear-
ance, the court should have jurisdiction of the action and the parties
thereto without further reference to domicile. The petition was de-
nied by the district court; the court of appeals affirmed; and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed. The statute was
designed for people outside the Virgin Islands and, therefore, exceeded
the power to legislate concerning subjects of "local application" dele-
gated to the territorial legislature by Congress. Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
Traditionally domicile has been the requisite jurisdictional basis for
divorce actions.2 The case of LeMesurier v. LeMesurier3 has been
18. See Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066, 1067 (1920); Brandt
v. Brandt, 40 Ore. 477, 67 Pac. 508, 510 (1902).
19. The possibility of such a renewal of liability is contrary to public policy
in that it tends to discourage marriage, the rearing of a family, and thereby
strikes at the very foundation of our social and economic life. See Keeney v.
Keeney, 211 La. 585, 30 So.2d 549, 551 (1947). See also 1 VAND. L. REV. 141
(1947).
1. Virgin Islands Divorce Act § 9(a). Bill No. 14, 8th Legislative Assembly
of the Virgin Islands of the United States, Sess. 1944.
2. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
181 U.S. 179 (1901); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110, comment a (1934).
3. [1895] A.C. 517 (P.C.).
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widely recognized as establishing the domicile requirement at common
law.4 A domicile of choice is acquired by intending to make a home
at a given place where one is physically present.5 Since domicile is a
question of law to be determined from the circumstances, it is the in-
tent to make a home not the intent to be domiciled which is controll-
ing.6 The rule that only a court at the domicile of one of the parties
has jurisdiction to grant a divorce is said to result from the fact that
every nation or state has the right to determine the status of its own
doiniciliaries.
7
A decree entered where both parties are domiciled, of course, oc-
casions few difficulties. When the spouses have acquired separate
domicile,8 however, problems of judicial jurisdiction have arisen.9 The
early doctrine of the Supreme Court was that a divorce was valid and
entitled to full faith and credit if granted: (1) at the domicile of both
spouses,10 (2) at the domicile of either spouse with personal jurisdic-
tion of the other through service or appearance," or (3) at the matri-
monial domicile 12 even without service within the state or an appear-
ance.13 Until the Supreme Court's decision in the first Williams case,
14
a divorce granted to a domiciliary without personal service on the
4. Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A
Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193, 194 (1951).
5. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 n. 9 (1942); Mitchell v.
United States, 88 U.S. 350, 353 (1874); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 671 (3d
Cir. 1953); Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 91 N.E. 394, 396 (1910); RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29 (3d
ed. 1949).
6. In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932). Cf. Williamson
v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914); Young v. Pollak, 85 Ala. 439, 5 So. 279, 282
(1888); McConnell v. Kelley, 138 Mass. 372, 373 (1885); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 29 (3d ed. 1949).
7. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942); Ellis v. Ellis, 55 Minn.
401, 56 N.W. 1056, 1058 (1893); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856); Hamm v.
Hamm, 30 Tenn. App. 122, 142, 204 S.W.2d 113, 122 (1947); 1 RABEL, THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 403 (1945).
8. This is made possible in the United States because of the modification of
the English unitary rule of domicile. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619,
625-26 (1914); Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407 (Ind. 1831); Harding v. Alden, 9
Greenl. 140 (Me. 1832); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1934).
9. A state's attempt to render a divorce, thereby creating interests, without
jurisdiction, is invalid as contrary to due process. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 43 (1934). But jurisdic-
tion to divorce has ordinarily been questioned under the full faith and credit
clause and not the Fourteenth Amendment. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS 295 (2d ed. 1951).
10. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Standridge v. Standridge, 31
Ga. 223 (1860). See Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317 (1905); 1 RABEL, CONFLICT
OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 465 (1945).
11. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U.S. 1869).
12. "Matrimonial Domicile" is used to signify: (1) The domicile of the hus-
band at the time of the marriage of the parties, and (2) the last common
domicile of husband and wife in divorce litigation.- GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 33 (3d ed. 1949).
13. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
14. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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non-resident spouse was not entitled to full faith and credit.15 Never-
theless, most states chose to honor such divorces.
16
The decision in the first Williams case was interpreted to mean that
a decree granted ex parte by a court finding the petitioning spouse to
be a domiciliary, regardless of the length of his sojourn, is entitled to
full faith and credit. Even prior to that decision there was a noticeable
relaxation in the requirements for domicile to effectuate a valid di-
vorce.17 The second Williams case18 held, however, that although an
adjudication of domicile by the court granting the divorce is prima
facie evidence of domicile, domicile is a jurisdictional factor which
may be determined de novo, if the decree is questioned in a sister state.
It was later held, however, that if the respondent appears in the earlier
proceedings and contests jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff
is not a domiciliary, an adverse ruling is res judicata.19 The same is
true where the respondent, though personally served, fails to appear,
and also where the merits are contested in a general appearance,
though the issue of domicile is not specifically raised.
20
These relaxations in the requirements for the establishment of
domicile21 have led authorities in the field of conflict of laws to antici-
pate the possibility of the Supreme Court's completely negating such
a requirement. The case of Alton v. Alton,22 concerning the statutory
provision in the instant case afforded an excellent opportunity for such
a holding. The minority in the Third Circuit maintained that the
domiciliary rule was a creation of nineteenth century judges and
could not, therefore, be one of those fundamental ideas which must be
read into the original provisions of our Constitution. This would sug-
gest that it was within the province of a state legislature to adopt
an alternative for domicile as an appropriate foundation for its divorce
15. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
16. Crimm v. Crimm, 211 Ala. 13, 99 So. 301 (1924); Beckwith v. Bailey, 119
Fla. 316, 161 So. 576 (1935); Voorhies v. Voorhies, 184 La. 406, 166 So. 121
(1936); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977 (1910). Contra,
People v. Baker, 76 N.Y. 78 (1879); Irby v. Wilson, 21 N.C. 568 (1837); Mc-
Creery v. Davis, 44 S.C. 195, 22 S.E. 178 (1895).
17. Arising in cases in which persons attacking the divorce either sought the
divorce, appeared in the foreign proceedings asking for special relief, or re-
married relying on the foreign decree. Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); Parmelee v. Hutchins, 238 Mass. 561, 131 N.E. 443 (1921); Hubbard
v. Hubbard, 228 N.Y. 81, 126 N.E. 508 (1920); Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y.
503, 66 N.E. 193 (1903); Scheper v. Scheper, 125 S.C. 89, 118 S.E. 178 (1923);
Loftis v. Dearing, 184 Tenn. 474, 201 S.W.2d 655 (1947). But cf. Hamm v. Hamm,
30 Tenn. App. 122, 149, 204 S.W.2d 113, 125 (1947).
18. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
19. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32
(1938); Note, 3 U. OF DETROIT L.J. 32 (1939).
20. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
21. Cf. Harris v. Harris, 205 Iowa 108, 215 N.W. 661 (1927) (compulsory
presence of soldiers and sailors does not result in new domicile); Nugent v.
Bates, 51 Iowa 77, 50 N.W. 76 (1879) (temporary absences do not affect domi-
cile); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22, comment b (1934).
22. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
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power. The case became moot, however, and never ,reached the Su-
preme Court. The instant case afforded a second opportunity for the
Supreme Court to pass on the matter. The issue was avoided by con-
demning the statute in question as exceeding the scope of the powers
granted to the legislature of the Virgin Islands.
Section 9 (a) of the Virgin Islands' divorce statute was enacted to
circumvent the decision in Burch v. Burch,23 which held that the terms
"inhabitant" and "residence" of its divorce statute must be interpreted
to mean "domiciliary" and "domicile" respectively. To accomplish this
result it was enacted that six weeks presence within the district was
prima facie evidence of domicile,24 and that if a party were personally
served or entered a general appearance the court should have juris-
diction without reference to domicile.
Petitioner's failure to show her appropriate connection with the
forum so as to be a rightful subject of legislation could be decisive only
if domicile is held to be a requisite to seeking divorce in the Virgin
Islands. The holding in the instant case cannot serve as a basis for
drawing conclusions as to the necessity of a domicile in the states
of the Union. The statutory provision that the legislative power of
the Virgin Islands "shall extend to all subjects of local applica-
tion ... ,"25 though a positive grant of power by Congress, is also a
definite limitation.26 "Until Congress shall see fit to incorporate terri-
tory ceded by treaty into the United States, we regard it as settled...
that the territory is to be governed under the power existing in Con-
gress to make laws for such territories and subject to such constitu-
tional restrictions upon the powers of that body as are applicable to the
situation."
27
The instant case is authority, therefore, only for the proposition that
the Virgin Islands, because of congressional limitations of their legis-
lative powers, cannot acquire jurisdiction for the purpose of granting
divorces over subjects not of "local application." The majority has
impliedly held that personal jurisdiction without domicile cannot grant
jurisdiction to the Virgin Islands, without expressing an opinion on
the requirement of domicile among the states.
23. 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952). See Reese and Green, That Elusive Word,
"Residence," 6 Vxr. L. REV. 561 (1952) and cases cited therein.
24. The first avenue of attack upon the "sacred cow of domicile," which the
court did not discuss, was to shift the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence on the issue of domicile by establishing a rebuttable presumption of
domicile. The creation of this presumption would seem to be in accord with
the Turnispeed doctrine. There is, conceivably, a rational connection between
the proved fact of six weeks stay and the presumed fact of domicile.
25. 49 STAT. 1811 (1936), 48 U.S.C.A. § 1405r (1952).
26. See Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation,
26 COL. L. REv. 823 (1926).
27. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904). See Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 299 (1901).
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LABOR LAW-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE-
PRIMARY JURISDICTION IN NLRB
Respondent filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Board alleging petitioner's strike and picketing to be an unfair labor
practice under the Taft-Hartley Act since its purpose was to compel
the insertion of a contract clause obligating the respondent to employ
only contractors under collective bargaining agreements with the
union. After filing but prior to Board action, the respondent sought an
injunction in a Missouri state court. A permanent injunction was
affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court more than a year after the
Board had found there to be no violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the
Act. The union conduct was held enjoinable as a violation of the state's
restraint of trade statute. On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. The NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine in the first instance whether charges reasonably come within the
prohibited or protected sections of Taft-Hartley. Thus the proceeding
in the lower Missouri court was void for want of jurisdiction. Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 75 Sup. Ct. 480 (1955).
The areas of exclusive federal regulation in labor-management
relations are gradually becoming defined, and yet many important
questions remain unanswered.' A recent landmark decision indicating
the scope of the congressionally occupied area was Garner v. Teamsters
Union which held that a state court may not under its own labor
statute enjoin peaceful picketing which constitutes an unfair labor
practice under the Taft-Hartley Act.2 The Court further implied that
picketing uncondemned by Taft-Hartley was intended to be free from
restraint.3 Although previously predicted by labor law commentators,
the Garner holding provoked voluminous speculation regarding the
future application of the pre-emption doctrine under the federal
statute.4 Despite its apparently broad scope, the decision expressly
1. See generally the following articles: Benetar and Isaacs, Pickets or
Ballots? The New Trend in Labor Law, 40 A.B.A.J. 848 (1954); Cox,
Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1954);
Kawano, State and Federal Jurisdiction in Labor-Management Relations, 31
DICTA 255-66 (1954); 7 VAND. L. REV. 422 (1954).
2. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
3. "The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types
of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other
methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the Labor Management
Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained by its
prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in
the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the
weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat
designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the
state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the
federal Act prohibits." 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1953).
4. Cf. Brody, Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor Relations, 5
LABOR L.J. 743-65 (1954); Forkosh, Government Impact on Labor-Management
Relations: Past-Present-Future, 5 LABOR L.J. 543-48 (1954); Rose, Garner v.
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conceded that areas remained within which states might validly regu-
late labor activity within interstate commerce.5 Thus, the authority
of earlier and subsequent case law-holding state regulation to be
appropriate in cases of violent conduct endangering public safety,
6
unduly coercive activity neither protected nor prohibited by the
federal statute,7 and in areas where Congress expressly authorized
state control 8 -remained unaffected by the Garner decision. Allowing
for these exceptions, the federal courts and most state courts have
consistently followed the Garner rule.9 Some state tribunals, however,
have exhibited considerable reluctance by limiting its application in
many instances. 10
Teamsters: The Supreme Court and Private Rights, 40 VA. L. REv. 177 (1954);
Shute, State versus Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes: The Garner Case,
19 Mo. L. Rev. 119 (1954); Whitney, NLRB Jurisdictional Policies and the
Federal State Relationship, 6 LABOR L.J. 3-6, 71-80 (1955)*; 3 BUFFALO L. REV.
326-28 (1954); 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 122-23 (1954); 54 COL. L. Rnv. 997-1002
(1954); 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 770-73 (1954); 7 VAND. L. REv. 422-27 (1954).
For an excellent discussion of congressional proposals to define the roles as-
signed to the Federal and State Governments, see Roumell and Schlesinger,
The Preemption Dilemma in Labor Relations, 18 U. DET. L.J. 135 (1955).
5. 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
6. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S.
740 (1942); Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 336
U.S. 301 (1949).
7. International Union A.W., AFL v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1953); Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal. 2d 392, 254 P.2d 559, 563
(1953). See 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 524 (1954) commenting on the California Supreme
Court construing Briggs-Stratton as giving the states jurisdiction over peaceful
union conduct neither specifically protected nor condemned by the Taft-Hartley
Act. See also 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 615 (1954).
8. Labor Management Relations Act [61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141, et seq.
(Supp. 1954) J. Section 14 (b) permits the states to enact laws forbidding union
shop contracts, and Section 10 (a) permits the ceding of jurisdiction to state
labor boards in unfair practice cases conditioned upon the requirement that
the state law correspond closely enough with Taft-Hartley to insure con-
sistency.
9. Building Trade Council v. Kinard Const. Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954); Your
Food Stores of Santa Fe, Inc., v. Retail Clerks Local No. 1564, 121 F. Supp. 339
(D.N.M. 1954); Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407, rehearing denied, 214 F.2d 349 (9th
Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954); United Mineral
& Chemical Corp., v. Katz, 118 F. Supp. 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Irving Subway
Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Montgomery Bldg.
& Constr. Trade Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 260 Ala. 382, 70 So. 2d 809
(1954); Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 273 P.2d 686 (Cal. 1954);
Dyer v. International Brotherhood, 124 Cal. App. 2d 778, 269 P.2d 199 (1954);
Perez v. Trifiletti, 74 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1954); Gulf Shipside Storage Corp. v.
Moore, 71 So. 2d 236 (La. 1954); Busch & Sons, Inc. v. Retail Union, of New
Jersey, Local 108, 15 N.J. 226, 104 A.2d 448 (1954); General Teleradio, Inc.
v. Manuti, 205 Misc. 655, 129 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Grimes & Hauer,
Inc. v. Pollock, 119 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1954); Leiter lfg. Co. v. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL, 269 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954);
Wichita Falls & So. Ry. Co. v. Lodge No. 1476, International Ass'n of Machin-
ists, 226 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd. v.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 200, 267 Wis. 356, 66 N.W.2d 318 (1954).
10. Contra: International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL v. Goff-McNair Motor
Co., 264 S.W.2d 48 (Ariz. 1954); Coutlakis v. State, 268 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1954); 33 TExAs L. REV. 401 (1955). See also 38 MmiNN. L. REv. 549 (1954)
discussing the power of state courts to grant injunctive relief in common, law
actions when Taft-Hartley is applicable. In answer to the contention that the
state court was without jurisdiction under the Garner decision an Oregon
court said: "I am not impelled to the denial of the jurisdiction of the state
1955]
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The later case of United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Con-
struction Corp." limited the Garner doctrine by holding that a state
court had jurisdiction to award damages even though there existed an
unfair labor practice which, under Garner could not have been en-
joined by a state court. In the Laburnum case no conflict was found
between federal and state remedies such as existed in the Garner case.
The absence of conflict, noted the Court, resulted from the fact that
the federal act is phrased primarily in terms of prevention and the
public interest, while private suits for damages occasioned by pro-
hibited union activity are authorized by the act, only in the case of
secondary boycotts.'2 Thus, at least where actual or threatened
violence is involved, the Taft-Hartley Act has not precluded traditional
common law action for damages in the state courts. 13 Indeed, at least
one state court has interpreted the Laburnum case as authorizing
actions for damages even in the absence of violence.14 According to
some writers, Laburnum confines the exclusiveness of Board juris-
diction over unfair labor practices to preventive procedures only. 5
In its most recent decision the Supreme Court has further defined
the area within which the Board's jurisdiction is exclusive.16 In a
rather precise mandate it asserted that a state court must, in deference
to the Board's primary jurisdiction, decline to hear cases where the
party seeking injunctive relief alleges facts which reasonably bring
the controversy within the coverage of the federal statute.17 The rule
appears to be only a logical outgrowth of the Garner doctrine. The
question remains opens as to what relief can be obtained in a state
court when the Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction. 18
court without some clearer, more definitive rule enunciated by higher
tribunals." M. & M. Wood Working Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners, 35 L.R.R.M. 2053 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1954), 41 VA. L. REv. 261 (1955).
11. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
12. 61 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 187 (Supp. 1954).
13. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954); Russell v. International Union, 258 Ala. 615, 64 So.2d 384 (1953). For
a discussion of the question of punitive damages in the state courts, see
6 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1954).
14. Benjamin v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540, 109 A.2d 300 (1954). Cf. Kuzma v.
Millinery Workers Union, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833 (1953). A careful
reading of the Laburnum case fails to disclose whether actual violence was
present; at any rate that case clearly involved threates of violence. Quaere-
Is even threatened violence necessary before the state courts can award
damages?
15. See Note, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 156-63 (1954); Note, 6 HAsTINGs L. J. 97-101
(1954); 29 TULANE L. REV. 155-59 (1954); 50 COL. L. REV. 1147-49 (1954);
Comment, 40 VA. L. REV. 805 (1954); 18 U. DET. L. J. 211-14 (1955).
16. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 75 Sup. Ct. 480 (1955).
17. Instant Case at 487-88.
18. Building Trades Council v. Kinard Constr. Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954).
Some light was cast upon the question recently when it was held that in
the absence of an NLRB request the federal court was powerless to enjoin
an action in a state court. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. The Richman
Brothers, 75 Sup. Ct. 452 (1955).
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LIFE INSURANCE - GOOD HEALTH CLAUSE - EXISTENCE
OF MALADY UNKNOWN TO INSURED
Widow of insured sought proceeds of two life insurance policies,
which required that insured be in good health at time of application
for and delivery of the policy.' Insured died from cancer eight months
subsequent to issuance of insurance. The cancerous condition existed
prior to application for and delivery of the policies, but was unknown
to either insured or insurer. Defendant insurer contended actual
good health was a condition precedent to its liability. The trial court
awarded judgment for the widow. Held, affirmed. When upon applica-
tion for and delivery of insurance policies insured had no knowledge of
an existing malady which might shorten his life, the good health
clause did not void the insurance. Brubaker v. Benejicial Standard
Life Ins. Co., 278 P.2d 966 (Cal. 1955).
Life insurance contracts generally contain the so-called "good
health" clause invalidating the policy unless application is made and
the policy delivered while the insured is in good or sound health.2
There is judicial agreement that the phrase must be given a reasonable
interpretation-one not requiring perfect health, but voiding the policy
only where the disease is of such a serious nature as to have the
tendency to shorten life.3 However, the courts are split as to whether
this clause means "actual good health" thus voiding the policy if there
actually exists a disease regardless of insured's knowledge,4 or merely
"apparent good health" in which case the contract is enforceable
unless insured knowingly deceives the company regarding his disease.5
1. "I hereby declare and agree . . . that this application . . . shall form a
part of any policy of insurance issued .. . that any policy issued shall not
take effect unless and until the full first premium has been paid and the
policy delivered to me during my good health .... and during my lifetime...
Instant Case at 968.
2. The clause continues in effect only during the period when the policy
is contestable. American National Ins. Co. v. Stutchman, 208 Ark. 1023, 185
S.W.2d 284 (1945).
3. Packard v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 1, 54 Atl. 287 (1903); VANCE,
INSURANCE 642 (3d ed. 1951); Prosser, Innocent Misrepresentation of Health in
Insurance Applications, 28 WVmN. L. REV. 141 (1944).
4. Bankers Life Co. of Des Moines v. Sone, 86 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1936);
Greenbaum v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 62 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1932); Kelly
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 131 Conn. 106, 38 A.2d 176 (1944); Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Willey, 133 Md. 665, 106 Atl. 163 (1919) Barker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 Mass. 542, 74 N.E. 945 (1905); Packard v.
Metropolitan Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 1, 54 Atl. 287 (1903); Metropolitan Ins. Co. v.
Howle, 62 Ohio St. 204, 56 N.E. 908 (1900); Nix v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W.,
180 S.C. 153, 185 S.E. 175 (1936); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chappell, 151
Tenn. 299, 269 S.W. 21 (1925); American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Jarrell, 50 S.W.2d 875
(Tex. 1932); Wright v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 248 S.W. 325 (Tex. 1923);
Scofield's Adm'x v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 Vt. 161, 64 Atl. 1107 (1906);
Logan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 Wash. 253, 181 Pac. 906 (1919).
5. Rasicot v. Royal Neighbors of America, 18 Idaho 85, 108 Pac. 1048 (1910);
Service Life Ins. Co. of Omaha v. McCullough, 234 Iowa 817, 13 N.W.2d 440
(1944); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Rehlaender, 68 Neb. 284, 94 N.W. 129 (1903);
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The "actual good health" theory, a majority rule in American
courts,6 is predicated upon the premise that actual good health is a
condition precedent to insurer's liability,7 and that the clause does not
fall within statutory provisions treating all warranties as representa-
tions. The risk of untruth of the answers is placed upon the insured.
The condition precedent principle thus prevents the contract from ever
coming into existence, even though the insured has no knowledge of
facts which would indicate a failure to satisfy the condition. The in-
sured's actual state of health, therefore, rather than his knowledge
or belief thereabout, is the determining factor.8
The court in the instant case, construing the good health clause as
meaning the insured's state of health unimpaired by any serious
malady of which he has knowledge, adopts a liberal minority view
which recognizes questions of health and disease to be of such
character as to call for statements of belief and opinion rather than
statements of fact.9 The good faith of the insured necessarily furnishes
the criterion of truth for statements of opinion;10 the answers con-
stitute no more than representations that so far as the insured knows,
his answers are true. The insured's reasonable interpretation of the
meaning of the statement, rather than the insurer's intention as to
its meaning, should be the guiding rule of construction. 11 The in-
surer's liability cannot be avoided without demonstrating that the
insured knew of the falsity of his statements and that he made them
with intent to defraud.'2
As previously stated most courts agree that "good health" does not
signify perfect health. It is submitted that this liberal interpretation
should be further extended to make the phrase a representation in-
stead of a condition precedent. If a warranty is desired by the insur-
ance companies, they should specify and detail the requirement that
United Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 175 Okla. 25, 51 P.2d 963 (1935); Suravitz
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 244 Pa. 582, 91 Atl. 495 (1914) (policy made
all statements representations rather than warranties; the Pennsylvania rule
where a warranty is involved is the strict actual-good-health rule.) There is a
third rule, akin to the apparent good health rule, which holds that the phrase
relates only to changes in the condition of the insured occurring after applica-
tion for the policy and before its delivery: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 129
Miss. 544, 91 So. 456 (1922); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ware, 169
Okla. 618, 37 P.2d 905 (1934).
6. VANCE, INsURANcE 643 (3d ed. 1951) states the majority view to be: "The
insured's good faith or his lack of knowledge of his true physical condition is
immaterial. . . ." But other authority states the majority rule to be that the
insured's knowledge is material. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kudoba,
323 Pa. 30, 186 Atl. 793 (1936).
7. Packard v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 1, 54 Atl. 287 (1903). But see 24
IowA L. REV. 787 (1939).
8. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chappell, 151 Tenn. 299, 269 S.W. 21 (1925).
9. Rasicot v. Royal Neighbors of America, 18 Idaho 85, 108 Pac. 1048 (1910).
10. United Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 175 Okla. 25, 51 P.2d 963 (1935).
11. Service Life Ins. Co. of Omaha, Neb. v. McCullough, 234 Iowa 817, 13
N.W.2d 440 (1944).
12. Aetna Lfe Ins. Co. v. Rehlaeder, 68 Neb. 284, 94 N.W. 129 (1903).
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the policy shall be voidunless delivered while insured is inactual good
health, regardless of his belief or misbelief as to his health. The instant
decision is more in consonance with reason and justice than is the
strict majority rule; it recognizes what the ordinary layman would
think the language to mean. An insured would expect to be asked
only of his knowledge of his health, not for an expert medical
opinion as to his actual health.
NUISANCE-LIABILITY FOR NONTRESPASSORY
INTERFERENCE WITH THE USE AND ENJOYMENT
OF LAND-INTENTIONAL INVASION
Plaintiffs bought a home in a mining community near the site of
defendants' coal mining operations. Refuse composed of waste and
reclaimable sulphurous coal was deposited on defendants' -land in
large dumps. These dumps emitted foul smelling hydrogen sulphide
gas which pervaded plaintiffs' land and by chemical reaction discolored
the paint on their dwelling house. The defendants did not know and
had no reason to anticipate either the emission of the gas or the coA-
sequent damage to plaintiffs' house. In an action for damages for
nuisance, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on a jury
finding that the defendants' conduct and the results therefrom did not
constitute a reasonable and natural use of defendants' land. This
judgment was affirmed by the superior court. On appeal, the supreme
court reversed, holding as a matter of law that defendants' conduct
was neither intentional nor unreasonable, nor was it negligent, reck-
less or ultrahazardous. 1 Waschak v. Moffat, 109 A.2d 31 (Pa. 1954).
This case brings clearly into focus the point, overlooked in the early
nuisance cases, that the basis of liability is the invasion of the plain-
tiff's rights in the use and enjoyment of his land by the tortious conduct
of the defendant.2 According to the Restatement, the conduct, to be
tortious, must, if intentional be unreasonable, or, if unintentional, must
be negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous.
3
1. Although unnecessary to its decision, the court held that the plaintiffs, by
buying with knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, assumed the risk
of all damage from the defendants' reasonable use of their land. Instant Case
at 316. This holding does not appear to be sound because one does not assume
the risk of a nuisance and a nuisance may exist through the negligent, reckless
or ultrahazardous conduct of the defendant even though the use of the land
may be reasonable. PROSSER, TORTS 425 (2d ed. 1955).
2. PROSSER, TORTS 391 (2d ed. 1955); Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Con-
cept in Pennsylvania: A Cormparison with the Restatement, 54 DIcK. L. REV.
109, 111 (1949-50).
3. Liability for nuisance has been imposed in a class of cases where the de-
fendant's conduct was unintentional and neither negligent, reckless nor ultra-
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The court adopts the Restatement rule as a complete statement of the
principles governing liability for nontrespassory interference with the
use and enjoyment of land. Applying this rule to the fact situation
of the instant case, the court held as a matter of law that the defend-
ants' conduct was neither negligent, nor ultrahazardous, thus disposing
of any liability based on unintentional conduct.
The court then turned to the key question of whether the defendants'
conduct constituted an intentional invasion. Its definition of intentional
invasion appears to be that of the Restatement which characterizes as
intentional only acts done for the purpose of causing an invasion or
conduct from which the actor knows an invasion is resulting or is sub-
stantially certain to result.4 This statement seems merely definitive of
the law as enunciated in the cases. In most nuisance cases the de-
fendant's conduct is intentional and the ensuing damage easily fore-
seeable.5 In others, although the defendant's original act causing the
harm may have been unintentional, the law treats a continuance of the
acts, after notice of harm, as being intentional.6 Several recent de-
cisions have adopted the exact language of the Restatement definition
of "intentional invasion."'7
The court, in applying this definition, pointed out that the emission
of hydrogen sulphide from culm dumps was rare and that defendants
did not know and had no reason to be aware that the gas would be
emitted and cause damage to the plaintiffs' house.8 It concluded,
therefore, that the invasion was not intentional. Although not dis-
hazardous. This doctrine has been variously called that of Rylands v. Fletcher,
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), absolute nuisance (nuisance "per se" or nuisance "in
fact"), ultrahazardous activity, strict liability for the keeping of dangerous
animals or trespass by blasting. Dean Prosser takes the position that regardless
of the name the principle of law upon which liability is imposed is the same.
This principle is "that if a man takes a risk, which he ought not to take with-
out also taking upon his shoulders the consequences of that risk, he shall pay
fir any damage that ensues." PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS
178-79 (1954). The Pennsylvania court purports to reject both the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher and that of absolute nuisance and to adopt the Restate-
ment rule. Considering Dean Prosser's analysis of the decided cases it appears
probable that this court will find itself following both of these rejected doc-
trines in applying the Restatement rule which imposes liability for uninten-
tional but reckless or ultrahazardous invasion of the use and enjoyment of
land. The relevant portion of the rule states: "The actor is liable in an action
for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land if . . . (d) the invasion is either (i) intentional
and unreasonable; or (ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 822(d) (1939).
4. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 825 (1939).
5. PROSSER, TORTS 392 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Shreffier, 139 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1943); Smith
v. Stasso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927); Vaughn v. Missouri Power
& Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. App. 1935).
7. Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App.2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954);
Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953); Columbian
Carbon Co. v. Tholen, 199 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Soukoup v. Repub-
lic Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App. 87, 66 N.E.2d 334 (1946).
8. Instant Case at 312.
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closed by the decision, it would seem desirable to assume that the bur-
den of proof was on the defendants to show that the invasion was not
intentional in view of the fact that damage was occurring and, as the
dissent points out, the entire town was permeated by an odor which
any high school chemistry student would immediately identify as
hydrogen sulphide gas.9
A recent Illinois decision gives the question of intentional invasion
almost identical treatment. 10 The facts were strikingly similar to those
of the instant case and differ only in that defendant's coal washer
emitted soot which together with noxious gases emitted by the refuse
pile damaged the plantiff's property. That court, while approving the
submission to the jury of the question of damages caused by the soot,
held as a matter of law that the defendant was not liable for damages
caused by the noxious gases because such gases, being caused by
spontaneous combustion which the defendant had taken all means to
prevent, were unintentionally released and were not certain to occur."
It would seem that the questions of intent and reasonableness should
be decided by the trier of fact unless, in the opinion of the court, they
do not present questions upon which the minds of reasonable men
could differ.12 Here, the trial court deemed the question of intent im-
material in a suit for damages for nuisance but did submit to the jury
what it considered the conflicting fact question of the reasonableness
of the defendants' use of their property. The reviewing court, in
adopting the Restatement rule, thereby injected into the case the ele-
ment of intentional invasion. It then considered the whole record and
concluded as a matter of law that the defendants' invasion of the
plaintiffs' interest in the use and enjoyment of their land was unin-
tentional. Such a holding is usual where the evidence is not con-
flicting but here the question of intent does not appear to have
been before the trial court.' 3 Thus the court is reviewing for inten-
tional invasion a record of a trial in which it was deemed unnecessary.
Possibly the better disposition of the case would have been to reverse
and remand with instructions to determine the question of intent.
The court's holding that the defendants' conduct was unintentional
was sufficient to preclude liability under the requirement of intentional
and unreasonable. However, it went further and held as a matter of
law that the defendants' use of their land was not unreasonable. 14
Since the facts indicate that the defendants are still dumping the ob-
jectionable refuse within the community although in a different loca-
9. Id. at 321.
10. Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App.2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954).
11. Id. at 52.
12. C.J.S., Nuisances § 153 (1950).
13. Instant Case at 312.
14. Id. at 317.
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tion, does the decision mean that the defendants will not be liable for
any future harm from .the same operation?
-Viewing the Restatement rule apart from any particular case, it
appears to be no more than a fair statement of the existing law as
laid down in the reported decisions with the possible exception of that
group of cases where strict liability is imposed. These are covered
under the Restatement rule as conduct that is unintentional and reck-
less or ultrahazardous. It may be that the requirement of reckless or
ultrahazardous conduct is too narrow. However, judicial construction
of the meaning of the two words could be sufficiently broad to cover
the reported cases where liability has been imposed without regard to
intent.
WILLS-HOLOGRAPHIC CODICIL-PUBLICATION OF AN
INVALID TYPEWRITTEN WILL
Testator, a lawyer, typed an instrument directing the disposal of his
property but did not sign it or have it attested by witnesses as required
by Oklahoma law.' He later added in his own handwriting a bequest
to his brother on the same sheet of paper. The testator signed and
dated this bequest.2 The lower courts would not admit this instru-
ment to probate. Held, (5-3) reversed with directions to probate the
will. A valid holographic codicil republishes and validates an invalid
typewritten will. Johnson v. Johnson, 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1954).
A general rule subscribed to by the majority of courts is that a
properly executed codicil which contains a reference to a prior invalid
will republishes that will.3 The prior will may have been invalid be-
1., "Every will, other than a noncupative will, must be in writing; and every
will, other than a holographic will ... must be executed and attested
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84 § 55 (1951).
2. "To my brother James I give ten dollars only. This will shall be com-
plete unless hereafter altered, changed or rewritten. Witness my hand thig
April 6, 1947. Easter Sunday, 2:30 P.M. D. G. Johnson Dexter G. Johnson."
Instant Case at 936.
3. Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26 (1928) (typewritten will at-
tested. by only one witness republished by holographic codicil); Hurley v.
Blankinship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963 (1950), 21 A.L.R.2d. 817 (1952) (valid
holf6raphic codicil republished unsigned holographic will); see In re Welch's
Estate, 272 P.2d 512 (Cal. 1954) (properly executed codicil operates as repub-
lication of a will, removing any possible taint of undue influence); In re
Kaiser's Estate, 150 Neb: 295, 34 N.W.2d 366 (1948) (codicil correctly describ-
ing beneficiaries republished will incorrectly describing them); Stevens v.
Myers, 62 Ore. 372, 121 Pac. 434 (1912) (a codicil executed with sufficient
testamentary capacity republished and cured will made without sufficient
capacity): For other cases see Notes, 21 A.L.R.2d 821 (1952); 87 A.L.R. 836
(1933). Cf. Notes, 33 A.L.R.2d 922, 925 (1954); 40 A.L.R.2d 698, 741 (1955).
For a discussion of this rule see 2 PAGE, WILLS § 545 (1941). In New York a
properly executed codicil does not operate as a republication of a will which
was defectively executed but does validate a will originally invalid for want
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cause of ineffective attestation,4 lack of testator's signature,5 want of
testamentary capacity,6 or undue influence. 7 Although not specifically
mentioned by many courts,8 the basic reason for this rule appears to
be the applicability in such cases of the doctrine of incorporation by
reference.9 In the decisions the courts continually insist that the re-
quirements of "incorporation by reference" be met-that the invalid
will be in existence at the time the codicil is made10 and that the
codicil refer to the existing instrument.11 This general rule is applied
in the states12 that admit holographic wills to probate 3 and in the
states that admit only a formally attested will.
14
Practically all the states permitting holographs admit to probate an
invalid holographic will which is followed by a properly executed
holographic codicil;15 in such a case there is no difficulty in complying
with the statutory requirement that the writing be entirely in the
of capacity or because of undue influence. Cook: v. "White, 43 App. Div. 388,
60 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1899), aff'd, 167 N.Y. 588, 60 N.E. 1109 (1901) (will ex-
ecuted at time testatrix was intoxicated was republished by a codicil executed
at time she was sober).
4. Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26 (1928).
5. Hurley v. Blankinship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963 ,(1950).
6. Barnes v. Phillips, 184 Ind. 415, 111 N.E. 419 (1916).
7. Taft v. Steams, 234 Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570 (1920).
8. The instant case speaks of republication throughout the decisi6n but men-
tions incorporation by reference in the last paragraph. Also see Rogers v.
Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1928); Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273,
125 N.E. 570, 572 (1920).
9. A leading authority states, "Analytically, if the first will was neverz valid,
the subsequent instrument cannot revive or republish the former. One cannot
restore that which never had life. Yet the courts often declare a revival in
cases in which the first instrument was not an effective will because of in-
capacity, undue influence, or want of proper execution. Properly speakingi
these decisions can be justified only on the theory of incorporation by ref-
erence of the earlier paper." ATrINsoN, WILLs 467 (2d ed. 1953). But see
Evans, Testamentary Republication, 40 HARv. L. REV. 71, 73 (1927) (Evans
states that a will invalid because unexecuted is neither validated by incorpora-
tion or republication by a validly executed codicil on the same page, but
rather there results an original execution.
10. The court in the instant case made a definite point to include testim6ny
from the trial showing the typewritten instrument was in existence before the
holographic codicil. 279 P.2d 928, 930.
11. Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570 (1920), 33 HARv. L. REV. 872
(1920).
15. Hurley v. Blankinship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963 (1950); In re Thomp-
Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. REV. 1, 25, 26 (1928) (Arizona, Arkansas, California,.
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wyoming).
13. Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26 (1928); Hurley v. Blankin-
ship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963 (1950); see Estate of Baird, 176 Cal. 381, 168
Pac. 561, 563 (1917) (re-execution of will by codicil disposed of any objection
to the will because of undue influence).
14. Barnes v. Phillips, 184 Ind. 415, 111 N.E. 419 (1916); Taft v. Stearns, 234
Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570 (1920).
15. Hurley v. Blankinship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963 (1950); In re Thomp-
son's Will, 196 N.C. 271, 145 S.E. 393 (1928), 62 A.L.R. 288 (1929); In re
Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192, 193 (1907) (incorporation by reference
gives effect to invalid holograph, without necessity of resorting to principle
of republication); see Hamlet v. Hamlet, 183 Va. 453, 32 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1945).
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testator's hand. The valid holographic codicil is said to republish the
invalid holographic will.16 The instant case, however, presents a dis-
tinctly different situation. Here, an invalid typewritten instrument
was followed by an appendage said to be a valid holographic codicil. 17
Though the holographic codicil was held to republish the invalid
formal will, authority contradicting this proposition exists.' 8 The sta-
tute requires that the will be wholly in the testator's handwriting to be
eligible for probate as a holographic instrument.19 Since the codicil and
the will are to be read as one,20 the typewritten will together with the
holographic codicil cannot meet the requirement of being entirely
in the testator's handwriting.2 ' Oklahoma, however, is not alone in
deciding that such an instrument may be probated.2 The basis for
these decisions would seem to be that the handwriting in the codicil
satisfies the statutory requirement that the will be entirely in the hand
of the testator.23 The original defect of the typewritten will is then
cured and both instruments may be admitted to probate. 24 Some of
the courts reason that it is just as permissible for a holographic will to
incorporate by reference material outside the will as it is for a formally
attested will.2
The view which does not permit the probate of the document seems
much the better.26 In all the states recognizing holographs the instru-
16. Hurley v. Blankinship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963, 965 (1950).
17. Instant Case at 931.
18. Sharp v. Wallace, 83 Ky. 584 (1886) (unattested holographic codicil
cannot validate a paper neither in the handwriting of the testator nor at-
tested). For an explanation of this holding see 2 PAGE, WILLS § 545 (1941). Cf.
Jones v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306, 307 (1929) (parts of a holograph not
in testator's handwriting must be disregarded); Hewes v. Hewes, 110 Miss. 826,
71 So. 4 (1916) (holographic letter could not incorporate by reference a
document not in the handwriting of the testatrix).
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 54 (1951).
20. The Oklahoma court has previously stated that a codicil and will are
to be considered as forming but one instrument. In re Gibbons' Estate, 192
Olda. 378, 137 P.2d 928, 929 (1943).
21. See Hewes v. Hewes, 110 Miss. 826, 71 So. 4 (1916).
22. Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26 (1928); Barney v. Hayes,
11 Mont. 571, 29 Pac. 282 (1892); cf. In re Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac.
192 (1907) (attempted holographic will, invalid because of printed matter, in-
corporated by reference into a valid holographic codicil); In re Thompson's
Will, 196 N.C. 271, 145 S.E. 393 (1928) (holographic codicil allowed to incorpor-
ate by reference printed matter (a promissory note) into a valid holographic
will). Regarding incorporation by reference compare Malone, Incorporation
by Reference of an Extrinsic Document Into a Holographic Will, 16 VA. L. REV.
571, 581-82 (1930) (no reason why holographic instruments may not incorp-
orate by reference outside material not in the testator's handwriting) with
Dobie, Testamentary Incorporation by Reference, 3 VA. L. REV. 583, 594 (1916)
(to allow this incorporation is completely contrary to the statute on holo-
graphic wills).
23. See Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1928).
24. See note 26 supra. (The codicil being a good holographic instrument
"Operates as a republication of the original will, although imperfectly exe-
cuted .... ").
25. In re Soher's Estate, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8, 9 (1889).
26. See 2 PAGE, WILLS § 545 (1941).
, [VrOL. 8
RECENT CASES
ment, to be admitted as a holographic will, must be wholly in the
handwriting of the testator.27 Holographic wills are allowed because
it is thought that a document entirely in the testator's handwriting is
a strong guarantee against fraud.28 By allowing an additional bequest
in the form of a holographic codicil to validate a typewritten instru-
ment without attestation or signature of the testator the present court
has eliminated an important safeguard against fraud. The principle
that a testator's intention should be followed whenever possible is
quite important,29 but the danger of fraud must be weighed against this
principle.30 Such a broad holding-that a holographic codicil re-
publishes an invalid typewritten will-seems a dangerous precedent.31
Under this holding the deceased was allowed to circumvent both types
of statutory regulation on wills in Oklahoma. He was able to type
most of his will without having it witnessed as for a formal will and
he was able to take advantage of the law regarding holographic wills
without writing the entire will by hand. If this decision is followed
the efficacy of the Statute of Wills as spelled out in Oklahoma law will
be substantially lessened and a way will be opened for fraud in Okla-
homa wills.
27. Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills, 14 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (1928).
28. ATmNsoN, WilLs 357 (2d ed. 1953).
29. Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570 (1920).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. For example, if an instrument such as that in the instant case were pro-
duced for probate, but there were no proof that the typewritten instrument was
executed prior to the handwritten material, the Oklahoma Court would be em-
barrassed by the broad rule of the instant case-that a bequqest in handwriting
on the same sheet as typewritten material is a holographic codicil republishing
an invalid typewritten will.
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